Panel I: The Use of Interim Measures by the Committee against Torture: Towards a Comprehensive Instrument for the Protection of Victims and Witnesses in Torture Cases by Legeay, Hélène et al.
Human Rights Brief
Volume 20 | Issue 4 Article 2
2013
Panel I: The Use of Interim Measures by the
Committee against Torture: Towards a
Comprehensive Instrument for the Protection of
Victims and Witnesses in Torture Cases
Hélène Legeay
Carla Ferstman
Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons
This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons
@ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Rights Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Legeay, Hélène, Carla Ferstman, and Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón. "Panel I: The Use of Interim Measures by the Committee against
Torture: Towards a Comprehensive Instrument for the Protection of Victims and Witnesses in Torture Cases." Human Rights Brief 20,
no. 4 (2013): 9-18.
9Opening Remarks from Hélène Legeay, Moderator*
Good morning, everyone. I am the Middle East and North Africa Programme Manager at Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT). ACAT is a French 
NGO based in Paris. Our main mandate is to fight against torture, 
the death penalty, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. To 
present our work in a few words, we provide training for lawyers. 
I have provided training for lawyers in Tunisia and soon, I hope, 
in Morocco as well. This training concerns how to document 
torture cases and how to file complaints before international 
enforcement bodies. ACAT released an annual report on the phe-
nomenon of torture around the world and we also release some 
country reports on a regular basis.
Among the means for assisting victims, ACAT has filed 
several petitions before international bodies, mainly before the 
Committee against Torture (CAT, Committee). For example, 
Gerald [Staberock] was talking about the petition concerning 
a man who was detained in Morocco and was supposed to be 
extradited to Algeria. ACAT filed this complaint and won.1 It was 
the first complaint against Morocco since Morocco recognized 
the competence of the CAT to take individual communications 
in 2006. So, it was the first complaint and we won the case before 
CAT and Morocco complied with the decision. This was really 
good news. Also, participating in the first hearing before CAT 
was my colleague in the Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan case.2 It was 
the first pleading in CAT and it was successful. I hope we will be 
able to develop that kind of procedure. 
I’m really glad to attend this conference and I’m sure it will 
give even more ideas on what we can do to collaborate together—
NGOs, researchers, and also CAT—to better assist the victims 
and get protection and reparations for them. Before introducing 
the first panel, I want to thank the Washington College of Law 
and OMCT (World Organisation Against Torture) for organizing 
this conference and for inviting me to moderate this panel, which 
is important for me and for ACAT as we have tried—sometimes 
successfully, sometimes not—to protect victims by asking CAT 
for interim measures orders. 
Interim measures—or what are called provisional or precau-
tionary measures—are ordered by international human rights 
bodies to preserve the rights of the parties to a case and to avoid 
the occurrence of an irreparable harm.3 An order of interim 
measures may require that the states take positive actions—like 
providing protection to the victim or access to a doctor—or to 
refrain from taking action by delaying an execution or an extradi-
tion until the case has been resolved by the international body. 
In torture cases, interim measures appear to be as important 
or sometimes more important than the consideration of the mer-
its of the case. The interim measures’ aim is to prevent torture in 
individual cases, to shield potential victims from these actions. In 
that sense, interim measures are—for the moment—the best tool at 
the disposal of international bodies to compel states to respect the 
main purpose of the conventions preventing torture. Reparations, 
rehabilitation of the victims, and prosecution of torture crimes are 
important issues that we will also address today. But, we all agree 
on the idea that the prevention of torture is what we want to achieve. 
As protective measures, interim measures are valuable tools 
as long as they are, first, adapted to the situation—to the threat—
and, second, as long as they are efficient. 
Although previously considered as merely recommendations 
by international bodies and their member states, interim measures 
have progressively gained binding authority, not only through 
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landmark jurisprudence, but also the International Court of Justice 
paved the way with its reasoning in the LaGrand case in 2001,4 and 
it has since been followed by other international or regional bodies. 
Despite this encouraging evolution of the international juris-
prudence, the legal status of interim measures is still uncertain. 
As Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón will address in his presentation, 
some states have proven quite willing to respect interim mea-
sures, but still, in too many cases, we have seen states breaching 
orders and consequently, victims suffering irreparable harm. 
Some of them have been executed, some have been extradited to 
a country where they have been ill-treated or tortured, and some 
have been threatened, attacked, or even killed in that country 
because of petitions that failed in front of an international body. 
As we can see, the good faith of states is still the basis for the 
efficiency of interim measures, like it is for the efficiency of the 
decisions of international enforcement bodies in general. In the 
last year, we have seen positive developments in international 
jurisprudence regarding the diversity of the interim measures 
ordered to protect the litigants. NGOs like REDRESS, ACAT, 
or OMCT assisting victims have widely contributed to these 
developments. The [Inter-American] Court of Human Rights 
has been at the forefront on the issue and a source of inspira-
tion for other international enforcement bodies. But, as Carla 
Ferstman will certainly explain more deeply in her presenta-
tion, much more could or should be done to provide the best 
protection to victims, or potential victims of torture, through 
interim measures. 
Remarks of Carla Ferstman*
introdUCtion
Today is extremely important, not only because it will explain and explore the importance of the UN Committee against Torture in the overall fight against impunity for 
torture. But also, it will touch on some very practical measures 
and hopefully this will help all of us in our respective areas of 
work to improve the situation of survivors of torture and those 
who face a risk of torture in their dealings with these types 
of bodies. 
At REDRESS,5 which is an organization based in the United 
Kingdom, we work with survivors of torture in all parts of the 
world and have taken cases before most regional human rights 
courts as well as many treaty bodies. When it comes to working 
with survivors of torture and considering what motivates them 
to bring a case before a regional or international human rights 
body, first and foremost what they are seeking is some form 
of acknowledgement of the harm suffered by an independent 
and impartial body that can draw attention to what they have 
experienced. Justice is not only, or not mostly, about any kind 
of revenge against a particular perpetrator or a state. It is really 
about trying to restore what the victim has lost, which is their 
dignity through the absence of rights in the context of torture. 
When it comes to the issue of protection, one of the biggest 
challenges for a torture survivor who is undertaking efforts to 
try to obtain some measure of justice, first at the domestic level 
and, if that fails, eventually at the international level, is risk of 
reprisals after already suffering from torture. We can understand 
why it is so important that the bodies, which are supposed to be 
there to provide a measure of redress, do not contribute to the 
problem and end up being a place that, by virtue of the victim 
seeking some kind of justice, creates a new risk of a reprisal. 
This is in a way the overlaying issue for many torture survivors 
that we need to consider.
Victims invariably face a range of problems when filing claims 
before international bodies. Certainly they face these problems 
when they file claims at the domestic level as well. Therefore, 
we should keep that in perspective. They face threats of physical 
violence to them and their families; sometimes these threats are 
carried out. They face further risk of detention; they face new or 
false claims or civil proceedings brought against them as some 
kind of punishment. Victims are sometimes forced to withdraw 
their claims as a result of pressure or extortion that they face. 
In 2007, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe made a very important statement in relation to the 
practice of forcing victims to withdraw their complaints in 
mostly, but not exclusively, applicants from the North Caucasus 
* Carla Ferstman is the Director of REDRESS (www.redress.org).
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region of the Russian Federation, as well as from Moldova, 
Azerbaijan, and—albeit less recently—Turkey.6 This resolution 
importantly indicated that the European Court of Human Rights 
should continue with cases where there had been some indica-
tion that the withdrawal by the victim had been requested under 
spurious grounds. So, it is quite interesting that all regional 
courts have faced this issue and it is not only an issue that has 
been faced by the UN Committee against Torture or the Human 
Rights Committee. 
There have been, very importantly, reprisals against human 
rights defenders and lawyers representing victims in claims 
before international bodies, as well as claims at the domestic 
level. So, all of these problems or challenges combine to make 
the prospect of seeking justice a risky business for victims 
of torture, which is very unfortunate. 
the Challenge of proteCtion of viCtims  
in international and domestiC CoUrts
Many of my comments will be based, at least in part, on a 
study that REDRESS conducted several years ago on the over-
all challenge of protection of victims.7 Part of the reason why 
we undertook this research was as a result of our work on the 
International Criminal Court and international criminal tri-
bunals, where as many of you know there is quite an exten-
sive practice on the protection of witnesses in the context of 
those tribunals, with the system at the International Criminal 
Court differing from the system in place at the ad hoc tri-
bunals—the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
and for the Former Yugoslavia. Unlike the ad hoc tribunals, 
where victims are only able to appear as witnesses, at the 
ICC, in addition to their role as witnesses, victims have an 
independent role where they can present information directly 
and participate in proceedings. However, the structures of 
protection at the ICC were modeled on the ad hoc tribunals 
and the ICC was therefore not adequately equipped to deal 
with victims who were acting on their own initiative. The 
ICC adopted a prosecution-initiated model where witness 
protection measures were accorded in relation to the impor-
tance of the particular witness to the criminal prosecution. 
The reason why I say this is because it is quite similar at the 
domestic level around the world. Victim and witness protection 
systems are typically established to deal with organized crime or 
serious crime cases and are managed by the prosecution service. 
So, when we think about the victim of a human rights abuse, who 
is seeking some kind of justice independent from any criminal 
prosecution that an office of the prosecutor might bring, there 
are a number of very specific challenges that the victim would 
face: first, in convincing the relevant bodies that the individual 
is entitled to protection when there is no criminal case; and sec-
ond, the typical bodies undertaking the protection are the police, 
sometimes the military, depending on the kind of case, which 
are in the context of human rights, often the same bodies that 
are allegedly responsible for the violations. 
So, it is quite important to situate the challenge of victim 
protection in human rights cases with regard to the situation 
that operates in most countries around the world. To the extent 
that protection mechanisms exist at the domestic level, they are 
not geared to human rights litigants. This is an overall problem. 
When we start to talk about interim measures, if a regional 
human rights court or a treaty mechanism is recommending that 
states take particular action, one must be mindful of the types of 
systems that exist at the domestic level. How will the state re-
spond to these interim measures, when it has very limited struc-
tures in place? This is an overall concern of which we should be 
mindful in considering the challenge of protection. 
Taking one step back, is there an obligation to protect? Is there 
a human rights obligation that states have to protect? The short 
answer is, of course, yes. But actually, when one looks through 
the wide variety of human rights treaties, one can see a distinct 
absence of the obligation set out in most typical treaties relating 
to human rights. The reason for that is typically, when we think 
about protection in the context of criminal trials, the victim is 
not normally or has not traditionally been seen as a party to pro-
ceedings. When we look at the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights,8 which has an extensive section on fair trial 
rights, there is no mention of the obligation to protect victims 
and witnesses. So, it is quite a stark absence in the overall system 
of human rights protection. 
important proteCtions in the Cat
Luckily though, when it comes to the United Nations Conven-
tion against Torture, we do have Article 13, which sets out in no 
uncertain terms the obligation of states to ensure that victims who 
are seeking justice do not face reprisals.9 This is a very important 
provision. Similarly, in the torture field, the Istanbul Protocol,10 
which deals with the medical and legal documentation of torture, 
clearly specifies that there is an obligation to protect victims and 
witnesses. But probably the most significant and extensive pro-
vision on protection is in the new International Convention for 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances,11 
which sets out state obligations in very clear terms. 
In accordance with the recent General Comment issued 
by the UN Committee against Torture on Article 14,12 which 
concerns the right to redress and rehabilitation, States Parties 
should also take measures to prevent interference with victims’ 
privacy and to protect victims, their families, witnesses, and oth-
ers who have intervened on their behalf against intimidation and 
retaliation at all times before, during, and after judicial, admin-
istrative, or other proceedings that affect the interest of victims. 
Failure to provide protection to victims stands in the way of 
victims filing complaints and thereby violates the right to seek 
and obtain redress and remedy. Here, the UN Committee against 
Torture underscores the relationship between the need to protect 
and other rights set out in the Convention, so the obligation to 
protect is not only a self-standing obligation—victims need to 
be protected—but when there has been a failure to protect, this 
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impacts a variety of other rights enshrined in the Convention, 
including the obligation to afford a remedy. 
What are the types of measures that states have at the domestic 
level? As I have already indicated in my introduction, most states 
that do have protection legislation, as well as protection struc-
tures, have developed these systems in the context of criminal 
law and particularly organized crime. At the international level, 
the UN Office on Drugs and Crime has spearheaded efforts to 
encourage states around the world to revise their laws and prac-
tices to protect victims and witnesses mainly in the context of 
organized crime. So, at the international level, there has been 
some movement to encourage states around the world to adopt 
protection legislation and establish protection units. However, 
this initiative of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime has focused 
on the criminal model. Therefore, it is not sufficient or adequate 
to respond to the needs of protection in a human rights case, 
with respect to human rights litigants. Moreover, as I previously 
mentioned, there are a whole range of protective measures within 
the international criminal realm, both during the trial proceed-
ings as well as measures on the ground to protect victims and 
witnesses. However for the most part, these too are focused on a 
prosecution model. 
the Use of interim measUres
What about victims who are not criminal witnesses, when 
they are bringing their own human rights cases? For me, this is 
the biggest challenge that we face. With respect to this massive 
gap, one of the areas which we can look at, and which I will 
discuss now, is the area of interim measures. Hélène [Legeay] 
has already indicated what interim measures are. Basically they 
are tools to stop or postpone the execution of a decision or an 
act that might prejudice the outcome of the proceedings before a 
final judgment is reached. They can also be positive, requiring a 
state to take particular action to forestall irreparable harm. There 
are also instances where an interim measure can be a request 
or an order to a state to stop negative action. One limitation of 
the system of interim measures is that they are typically only 
available for serious and urgent cases. So, we must consider this 
in light of the variety of needs that torture survivors have with 
respect to protection and whether they all fit within the context 
of serious and urgent cases. Most cases fall under these criteria; 
however it can often be a question of evidence, whether evidence 
is strong enough to demonstrate the sufficient level of urgency 
and seriousness. 
Another question is whether interim measures are able to 
provide all of the protection needs of torture victims trying to 
bring a case at an international level. The first issue is how one 
assesses the definition of avoiding irreparable harm. Will it nec-
essarily be applicable to protection concerns that are perhaps not 
amounting to death threats or serious bodily injury? How do we 
define serious irreparable harm? Do we define it in relation to 
the harm to the victim, or perhaps can we go further and define 
it in terms of harm to the case? Because certainly one of the 
roles of interim measures is to safeguard the situation so that the 
litigation can proceed. So, in terms of how we look at the issue of 
irreparable harm, does the fact that a victim has been threatened, 
which may force her to withdraw a particular case, amount to 
sufficient harm although not physical harm?
Another question is whether interim measures are able to 
address threats against lawyers and human rights defenders, in 
addition to the direct victim. In principle, one would think that 
they should be, though the relevant provisions and regulations 
are not actually so clear. If we read rule 114 of the UN Com-
mittee against Torture’s regulations, the first paragraph: “At any 
time after the receipt of a complaint, the Committee, a work-
ing group, or the Rapporteur(s) on new complaints and interim 
measures may transmit to the State [P]arty concerned, for its 
urgent consideration, a request that it take such interim measures 
as the Committee considers necessary to avoid irreparable dam-
age to the victim or victims of alleged violations.”13 How does 
one interpret that? Can we possibly say that the threats to the 
lawyers are part and parcel of irreparable damage to the victim? 
Certainly that would be an appropriate way in which to look at 
the matter. However, that interpretation probably goes one step 
beyond the plain meaning of the text.
Are interim measures able to deal with reprisals after the fact? 
So, let’s say the UN Committee against Torture issues a decision, 
and as a result the state concerned is very angry and the indi-
vidual concerned is re-tortured, possibly even killed. What can 
the treaty body do in that kind of circumstance? I would suggest 
that interim measures, because of what exactly they are, would 
have difficulty to operate after the fact. Therefore, the question is 
what else needs to be in place to ensure the continued ability of 
the Committee to have oversight over the protection needs after 
it has issued a decision. Certainly, as the UN Committee against 
Torture has itself recognized in its recent General Comment, 
there is a link between remedy and protection. So the UN Com-
mittee against Torture or any treaty body or other international 
mechanism can, in light of the need to guarantee non-repetition, 
set out the obligation to ensure continued protection to the vic-
tim and others concerned. This could potentially be addressed in 
relation to the remedial order at the end of the case to the extent 
that the Committee has continuing supervisory ability at the end 
of the case, which many bodies do. 
Another concern is the response by the different states 
to interim measures. This has to do with the overall challenge 
of enforcing anything that a treaty body or even some of the 
regional courts recommend or order, as the case may be. I suggest 
two main issues with respect to the response to interim measures. 
The first concern is limited capacity. As already indicated, one 
of the most significant challenges is the limitation of domes-
tic legislation and domestic procedures on the ground to deal 
with protection concerns. So, if an order or request for interim 
measures is made to a particular country where the systems and 
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structures are not adequately in place, there will be a capacity 
problem with respect to the ability of that state to appropriately 
and effectively give effect to that order or recommendation. The 
second concern is the lack of will. This is particularly problem-
atic for the treaty bodies, whose ‘views’ or decisions are not 
understood as binding, although of course the argument can be 
made that the views and decisions of the treaty bodies are neces-
sarily binding given that they are the authoritative interpretation 
of the treaty, which the states have agreed to enforce. 
With respect to the legal basis of interim measures, there are 
several different types of frameworks. Some courts and bodies 
have within their treaties the power to order interim measures. 
So, for instance, the International Court of Justice, or the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights have specific provisions 
in their founding documents which deal with these matters. 
Others do not have such provisions in their statutes, but internal 
regulations have provided their ability to order interim measures. 
Here we can think of the European Court of Human Rights as an 
example, which has developed rules, but they are not part of the 
statute as such. And, other bodies have no provisions either in 
the statute, or in regulations, however they nonetheless interpret 
their mandate to allow them to order interim measures. 
With respect to how these different frameworks have been 
understood, the International Court of Justice has come out 
with an important decision, which Hélène has already men-
tioned, in the LaGrand case.14 The Court indicated that the 
failure of the United States to implement the interim measures 
that were issued by the International Court of Justice consti-
tuted a violation of the United States’ obligations. In that par-
ticular case, it was quite interesting, because the International 
Court of Justice in its Statute specifically recognizes interim 
measures; however, it does not go so far as to indicate that 
the interim measures contained in the Statute are binding. So, 
it is mentioned in the Statute; however, there is no mention 
of whether they are binding or recommendatory. Nonetheless, 
the International Court of Justice’s decision concluded that be-
cause of the important role of interim measures in safeguard-
ing the sanctity of the system, those interim measures had to 
be regarded as binding. 
There has been progressive development in the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights. In an early case re-
garding an expulsion from Sweden to Chile, the European Court 
indicated that the interim measures were not binding. But that 
position has changed. In a more recent case regarding an extradi-
tion from Turkey to Uzbekistan, the European Court made a very 
clear finding that interim measures must necessarily be binding. 
To a certain extent, this judgment was likely influenced by the 
LaGrand case, given the timing. 
ConClUsion
In summary, with respect to the legal basis for interim mea-
sures, we have a variety of different systems. The legal basis 
will be determined either by treaty, internal rules, or it will be 
determined by implication, binding on the basis of a good faith 
interpretation of the relevant treaties. Bodies that issue views or 
recommendations face distinct challenges in the sense that if the 
overall mandate of the body is not capable of issuing binding 
decisions, and therefore it is more difficult to imply a binding 
nature to an interim measure. This is one of the challenges of 
UN treaty bodies in trying to cultivate the argument that interim 
measures are binding. Not to say that the argument cannot be 
made—certainly it can and it should—but one can understand 
why it can be difficult, and why certain states have not seen it 
necessary to enforce interim measures. 
In conclusion, the first way to strengthen protection measures in 
the context of human rights litigants’ need for protection is to make 
the system of interim measures as binding as possible. Second, I 
suggest that it is necessary to clarify what states are obliged to do in 
order to make protection effective. Given the gaps at the domestic 
level, it would be helpful for international bodies—including the 
treaty mechanisms, and in particular the UN Committee against Tor-
ture—to explain in great detail what is necessary to protect human 
rights litigants in the context of the Convention. This is something 
which has not been done; domestic practice is inadequate, interna-
tional standards are simply not sufficiently clear. While there must 
be continued efforts to tackle the lack of will at the domestic level, 
capacity is something that one has a greater chance of influencing. 
Making those standards as clear as possible to enable implementa-
tion by domestic authorities is important. 
What are the positive measures of protection that human 
rights bodies can insert into their interim measures? The UN 
Committee against Torture and other bodies can be more de-
scriptive in the types of measures that they set out in their interim 
measures findings. And, also it would be helpful to strengthen 
follow-up mechanisms, both follow-up of interim measures as 
well as follow-up of decisions where protection features as part 
of the decision. In addition, it may be useful for the Committee to 
issue a General Comment on Article 13 of the Convention against 
Torture. It could be quite interesting and it could potentially have 
an important role not only in relation to the Convention against 
Torture but also with respect to the clarification of applicable 
standards of protection in human rights cases more broadly. 
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Remarks of Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón*
introdUCtion
I think the topic of this panel is a fascinating discussion overall, the theme of the conference is a very practical perspective to sit and find some new ideas to improve the 
protection mechanisms, particularly the individual complaint 
mechanisms of the Convention against Torture (CAT, Convention), 
and again to begin to look to different types of mechanisms that 
exist around the world. In my case, I was invited to talk a bit 
about the Inter-American Human Rights System. Particularly, 
I would like to focus on the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR, Commission). A lot has been written 
and said about the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, but 
a more detailed and narrow approach exploring the powers and 
practice of the Commission as a reference for discussion with 
the mechanisms of the treaty bodies of the UN—particularly the 
Committee against Torture—could be extremely useful and has 
yet to be explored in-depth.
I am going to tell you why I think it is very important 
to narrow it down and to begin to look at the practice in the 
Commission in the framework and architecture of the Inter-
American Human Rights System.
Human rights supervision is now a very well-settled practice, 
general supervision—when we talk about countries, thematic 
reports, general comments, and advisory services—as well 
as individual complaints. In order to discharge their mandates 
under the corresponding human rights treaties, these powers 
have developed and evolved constantly to improve promotion 
and protection of human rights in light of the object and purpose 
of the pertinent treaty. On the one hand, the general supervisory 
powers play a very important role in inducing states to adopt 
structural changes that will prevent future violations of human 
rights in the immediate term. Such general supervision is also 
a very useful instrument to highlight the existence of endemic 
problems in specific countries or specific issues in a region, and 
in many instances empowers the work of civil society organiza-
tions and other actors on the local level.
In the realm of individual complaints, most of the powers 
of these international mechanisms have been geared toward 
establishing the international responsibility of the state. This of 
course usually occurs after violations have occurred, and the only 
available remedies are reparations, including compensation. In 
fact, this usually happens months, if not years later, after local 
remedies have been exhausted. It is ex post facto action on the 
international level on the basis of the traditional finding of inter-
national responsibility of states.
However, one of the key elements of human rights regimes is 
the need to prevent human rights violations, which is arguably 
one of the most important aspects of the object and purpose of 
such regimes. This is true as a duty of states and it is true to 
inform the work of international human rights bodies. This may, 
for example, explain in part why the UN treaty bodies, such as 
the Human Rights Committee or the Committee against Torture, 
have established in the Rules of Procedure the power to adopt 
interim measures.15 Such a preventive mandate requires the exer-
cise of expansive actions to adequately respond to certain human 
rights violations.
This expansive interpretation of these committees’ own 
powers has been replicated by the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights. While only the Inter-American Convention 
on Forced Disappearance of Persons16 explicitly refers to such 
a power—interim measures—the Commission has included in 
its Rules of Procedure such a provision since the 1980s.17 And 
it is recognized by most states of the [Organization of American 
States] as a legitimate development of its implied powers in indi-
vidual cases under the American Convention on Human Rights18 
and under other regional international treaties.
This provision has evolved constantly to the current draft 
recently approved by the Commission, which will enter into 
force in August of this year. Hopefully I will be able to talk a 
little bit about this process.
strUCtUre of the inter-ameriCan Commission
I will focus on some aspects of the practice of the Com-
mission that could be interesting and useful for the discussion 
about provisional measures of the Committee against Torture. 
* Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón is Professorial Lecturer in Residence and 
Co-Director of the Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 
at American University Washington College of Law.
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However, I will not deal with the provisional measures of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as I intend to narrow the 
presentation to the powers of the Commission, as an interesting 
reference of quasi-adjudicatory bodies on the practice of interim 
measures.
Let me now turn to explain very briefly the general frame-
work, the general architecture of powers that inform the 
Commission’s practice on the protection and promotion of 
human rights. The Commission has received a very broad 
mandate by the states of the Organization of American States. 
The Commission has both the power to deal with general situa-
tions and deploy diplomatic and political tools to confront human 
rights violations of all sorts. The Commission can use these pow-
ers to confront individual situations or more structural endemic 
problems, as well as gross and systematic violations of human 
rights, as it has done in the past, through several decades during 
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s in Central America, in the Southern 
Cone, and in the Andean region, where we saw the practice 
by several states of massive violations of human rights.
One of the most notable mechanisms of the Commission is 
its power to perform on-site visits, a function in place since the 
inception of the Commission in the 60s. In the first decade of 
existence, the Commission performed several on-site visits to 
the countries of the region. As you may very well know, this is a 
very intense proposition for an international supervisory body to 
deploy itself into the jurisdiction of one of the supervised states, 
but it has settled into a very important practice of the Commission 
to confront, among others, systematic violations of human rights.
Another very important set of tools with respect to this general 
supervisory power of the Commission is country reporting. The 
Commission has reported systematically about country situations 
throughout the region and regional endemic problems. The most 
important report, I believe, of the Inter-American Commission, 
was the Report on Terrorism and Human Rights,19 released after 
September 11, 2001. This report basically collected the Com-
mission’s prior activities from the previous decades throughout 
the region—regimes arguing that they were combating the threat 
from terrorist groups and adopting measures that clearly violated 
human rights law. The Commission was very quick in introduc-
ing this general report on terrorism and human rights to engage 
in a dialogue with countries, many of them, including the [United 
States], engaged in practices that, in my opinion, clearly violated 
established international human rights law.
individUal Complaints and interim measUres
There are other mechanisms, such as rapporteurships, interim 
measures, and cases regarding torture, as well as other practices 
such as press releases. But I want to now turn to the adjudicatory 
dimension, which of course takes us into the realm of interim 
measures. The adjudicatory dimension of the Inter-American 
Commission must be understood again in this architecture by 
which the Commission holds the key of access to individual 
complaints in the Inter-American System. And it means that all 
cases, all interim measures, are first processed in the Commis-
sion and subsequently could end up reaching the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights. So, in order to understand the rightful 
dimension of the individual complaint system in the Americas 
region, we have to understand that the process of the Court is not 
a different process from that of the Commission on individual 
complaints. It is one system, one procedure, in which there is 
a process of incremental pressure on states. And there are dif-
ferent moments in the processing of petitions that empower the 
Commission, empower the victims, petitioners or in many cases 
government officials, to do things on a national level in order to 
respond to the process in the Inter-American Commission and 
the Inter-American Court.
In the framework of the individual complaints procedure in 
the Inter-American System, we will explore the normative struc-
ture that informs the individual complaint procedure, specifically 
the interim measures regime in the individual complaint proce-
dure in the Inter-American System. The Commission primarily 
grants precautionary measures to protect persons from grave and 
imminent danger of injury of rights recognized under the Ameri-
can Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (Declaration)20 
and other regional treaties. This is the normative regime that 
informs individual cases and that of course is directly relevant 
to the adoption of interim measures. The Charter of the Orga-
nization of American States21 sets out the legal architecture of 
the OAS and it is binding on all OAS members, including the 
[United States], Canada, and all Central American, Caribbean, 
and South American countries—all of the region.
Under Article 106 of the Charter, the primary function of 
the Commission is to promote the observance and protection of 
human rights and to serve as a consultative organ of the OAS in 
these matters. The notion of protection in this provision neces-
sarily involves the powers to receive and adjudicate human rights 
cases. Every state in the Americas has accepted the competence 
of the Commission to consider the individual complaints con-
cerning alleged human rights violations that occur in their ju-
risdiction just by ratifying the Charter. For those states that have 
not yet ratified the American Convention, the Commission will 
determine whether the state violated the rights set forth in the 
American Declaration. The Commission and the Inter-American 
Court have both held that the Declaration, although not initially 
adopted as a legally binding instrument, is now a source of legal 
obligation for OAS Member States. Additionally, by approving 
the Commission’s Statute, the Member States have established 
the Commission’s authority to receive and decide individual 
complaints alleging violations of the Declaration against those 
states that are not parties to the Convention.
Furthermore, the Commission has read the Declaration as an 
evolving source of law, noting that its application is consistent 
with the practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
Therefore, the Declaration serves as a parallel to the American 
Convention for those states that have not ratified the American 
Convention.
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In the Inter-American System, the purpose of precautionary 
measures is to prevent irreparable harm to persons or to preserve 
the subject matter of the proceedings in connection with pending 
litigation. Therefore, their adoption does not require a case 
pending before the Commission, nor do they have to join the 
claim of a human rights violation. Although the precautionary 
measures are not explicitly mentioned in the American Conven-
tion or statute, as I mentioned before, these measures have been 
institutionalized for decades through Rules of Procedure of the 
Commission.22 Under Article 25 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Commission, in serious and urgent situations the Commission 
may, on its own initiative or the initiative of a party, request that 
a state adopt precautionary measures.
If protections are provided by the state as a result of an order 
issued by the Inter-American Commission, these may be due to 
its own motion or at a request of a party. Taking into consider-
ation the special circumstances existing in several states of the 
Americas, the Commission has adopted precautionary measures 
to protect persons on an individual and collective basis. In this 
sense, beneficiaries of precautionary measures have been, among 
others, human rights defenders, persons in detention—some of 
whom have been sentenced to capital punishment or are being 
kept in deplorable health conditions—persons being harassed in 
the context of judicial procedures, persons with health problems, 
children, and entire communities of indigenous peoples.
stUdy on the Commission’s  
Use of preCaUtionary measUres
Behind each one of these situations, there are grim realities 
that stem from armed conflict, discrimination, poverty, corruption, 
precarious prison conditions, and impunity, which unfortunately 
still exist in the Americas. On this basis, with a colleague in the 
University of Ghent in Belgium, we studied all of the measures 
that have been adopted by the Inter-American Commission since 
they first adopted this power in the regulations in the 1980s; we 
ended up with a collection of 771 precautionary measures. Then 
we studied how the Commission dealt with petitions regarding 
different countries—the Americas is composed of a very diverse 
set of countries, some of which have gross, systematic violations 
of human rights, others with established democracies—to under-
stand the scope of application of the precautionary measures of 
the Commission and how they have been used in its history.
We intend to release this article in two or three months, and 
hopefully it will increase understanding of the Commission’s 
measures, as opposed to the practice of the provisional measures 
of the Court, given that there is much more information on these. 
The Commission can issue measures regarding any right recog-
nized by the Inter-American instruments for which the individual 
complaint procedure is available, that is the basic prerequisite. 
This very broad subject matter jurisdiction is, however, limited 
by notions that were mentioned before—gravity, urgency and 
irreparability of a particular situation, and on those bases it has 
narrowed its measures to specific situations and specific rights.
After doing a very quick analysis of the measures, we found 
that of the 771 measures adopted by the Commission from 1994 
to 2012, 665 measures dealt with the right to life, along with 
other rights. Six hundred thirty-four measures dealt with life and 
humane treatment. Five hundred eighty-two dealt with personal 
integrity, along with rights other than the right to life. Eighty-
three measures dealt with the right to life alone. Only seven mea-
sures dealt with humane treatment alone—not related to the right 
to life or other rights under the American Convention. Therefore, 
the great majority of the precautionary measures adopted by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have focused on 
these non-derogable core rights established both in the Declara-
tion and the American Convention.
We have numbers for other rights related to, for example, 
freedom of expression with 25 measures; right to health with 26 
measures; equality with fifteen measures; personal safety with 
thirteen measures; and liberty with eight measures. You will see 
that there is a clear focus of the Commission on these particular 
rights, even though the normative framework of the Commission 
is very broad—not only right to life, equality, and personal integ-
rity, but many other rights. The Commission has been very delib-
erate and careful in using these powers on these types of rights, 
dispelling some conceptions that the Commission has been very 
liberal in dispensing precautionary measures in all sorts of situ-
ations, particularly in the framework of the Belo Monte case.23 
Another important finding that illustrates the scope and where 
the Commission focuses its measures are the number of precau-
tionary measures issued by country. Which countries receive the 
most precautionary measures? In the last decade, Colombia had 
the most with 173 measures. Then comes Guatemala, with 97 
measures, then Mexico with 75, and—I would say surprisingly 
for some and not for others—the United States is fourth, with 72 
precautionary measures. As you can imagine, these entail issues 
of non-refoulement and issues related to the death penalty.
There is very little information about the implementation of 
the measures. We only found some references, particularly deal-
ing with the death penalty. Of the death penalty cases, there were 
only a few reported—139 cases reported on the death penalty, 
and only 45 of those cases were followed up in these reports. 
And of those 45 death penalty cases, there was some sort of 
compliance with the measures only in half of them. The [United 
States] complied with seven cases with interim measures of the 
Commission. Other countries have complied with precaution-
ary measures—half of them have been complied with in some 
way or another, partly on the basis of the report regarding death 
penalty cases.
the valUe of preCaUtionary measUres
Finally, I would like to highlight a couple more issues. First is 
the importance of precautionary measures for the protection of 
the most basic rights. The Commission has been very deliberate 
in opening its measures not only for situations that have been 
dealt with in cases, as I mentioned, but beyond that. You can 
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bring a petition for precautionary measures to the Commission 
even before you have filed the case in the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights. This is a very broad interpretation 
of its implied powers. States have not opposed this interpreta-
tion, so there is a consistent practice. Opposition comes from, 
for example, the United States under the American Declaration, 
stating that there is no jurisdiction of the Commission on that 
softer regime. The United States has not ratified the American 
Convention. However, the practice of issuing protective measures 
beyond the existence of a case, is a very well-settled practice.
I submit to you, and I think it is something that we could 
eventually discuss, that if we think about the object and purpose 
of a convention such as the American Convention, the traditional 
notion of interim measures being linked to the existence of a case 
may be appropriate in situations where there are two countries 
involved in inter-state litigation before the International Court of 
Justice. But, when you are talking about these public regimes, in 
which you are protecting human rights, the object and purpose 
is prevention which governs the interpretation of the powers of 
the organs that supervise implementation. And in that sense, it 
would be quite narrow to apply these measures, in the case of the 
Inter-American System, only when there is a case already filed. 
There are some dilemmas that, I think, have been solved in the 
case of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and, 
that having a viable case in terms of the American Convention 
would not be an adequate interpretation of the need to have quick 
action. I think it is an important reference regarding provisional 
measures in the [Committee against Torture] and the possibility 
of improving how you read the Convention, and how to re-craft 
the rules of procedure.
the Commission’s responses and enforCement
From the perspective of the Inter-American Human Rights 
System, I can mention that prevention is a real-time exercise. 
In that sense, when someone is in danger of being tortured, how 
can you interpret your normative framework in order to be able 
to react in those situations to say, “I am a human rights body, 
I have to develop tools that would allow me to prevent torture 
in real time, one of the most dramatic situations that you can 
have in the violation of human rights”? In that sense, I think the 
[Inter-American] Commission [on Human Rights] has been very 
strategic in the use of press releases. The Inter-American Com-
mission indeed has used its press release capabilities when there 
are certain situations. For example, on September 26, 2012, the 
Commission issued a press release concerning the acts of vio-
lence in a prison of the United States. It basically reacted to what 
was happening in real time, using this press release, not neces-
sarily precautionary measures, but again with careful wording 
indicating the Commission is worried about what is happening 
in those particular settings.
One of the aspects of the latest developments that I think is 
very important in the practice of the Commission is oral pro-
ceedings. Oral proceedings have been crucial and if we step back 
and think about the enforcement of human rights law, I believe 
there is an intrinsic relationship between international regimes 
and the publicity, the mobilization of information in order to 
signal: “Where do we have problems, in which countries?” 
The oral proceedings were happening in the Commission since 
the creation of the mechanism, but were strengthened with the 
creation of the Inter-American Court proceedings. So, once the 
Court was in place in 1980, the Commission and the new regula-
tions allowed for more liberal use of oral proceedings in indi-
vidual cases. The Commission had been holding hearings here 
in Washington, D.C., two times a year, and as soon as Internet 
was available, these new technologies allowed for the more ef-
ficient dissemination of information, including webcasting of the 
hearings through the Internet. This included not only cases and 
hearings in individual cases, but also in precautionary measures. 
So, there are several cases in which precautionary measures have 
been dealt with in the public scene using these technologies.
On the other hand there is enforcement. Once the public is 
aware and sees the government and the parties talking about the 
situation that is probably occurring in real time, you may have a 
good possibility of preventing torture or arbitrary execution. I do 
accept that there are other situations in which you have to be very 
careful when you are using publicity because you could create 
problems, but again, you assess in which situations this can be 
useful and in which situations it should not be done. The Com-
mission can refrain from publishing certain names to avoid this 
problem. This publicity is very important for enforcement and in 
the case of precautionary measures and provisional measures, it 
induces certain pressure on states to prevent irreparable damage.
Case stUdy: gUantanamo bay
The last thing I want to comment on is one interesting ex-
ample of how the Commission works and the possibility of the 
use of the mechanisms of the Commission and the famous Guan-
tanamo measures of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights. The United States has not ratified the American Conven-
tion, so it was only [subject] to the Commission’s procedures and 
interim measures—the Court was not available. These measures 
were adopted only a few months after September 11, 2001—less 
than a year. In March 2002, the first measures were issued by the 
Inter-American Commission, when information began to trickle 
in that there could be violations occurring in Guantanamo and 
elsewhere, and that people could be tortured. The Commission 
began to issue interim measures; there was no case then, only 
interim measures. It began to document and put pressure on the 
United States as the only mechanism available for individual 
complaints regarding this country.
The Commission began to expand, modify, and amplify these 
measures throughout the years—2004, 2005, 2007, etc. The 
latest developments are very interesting because now some of 
the petitioners—the Center for Constitutional Rights and CEJIL 
(Center for Justice and International Law) here in Washing-
ton—have requested that the Commission begin to implement 
public hearings on the situation in Guantanamo, and to hold 
public hearings that are streamed through the Internet, and to 
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mobilize public information. So, this is something that shows 
that these petitioners that are using the individual complaint 
procedure, using the interim measures, using the cases that have 
been filed subsequently, now are resorting to the political 
diplomatic powers of the Commission seeking a thematic hearing 
from the Commission regarding the situation of human rights 
in Guantanamo and elsewhere.
For those that are interested, you can look for this information 
on CEJIL’s website,24 among others, and see the latest develop-
ments, how it advocates, and how petitioners are using all of 
the tools at their disposal to induce pressure in a specific situa-
tion. The Guantanamo measures, I think, are a very interesting 
example in this regard.
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